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only to sellers and can be negligently violated. The linguistic battle carried
on by the courts under the present securities laws should be resolved by
congressional enactment of the ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code.
Adoption of the Code would allow decisions to be based on policy rather
than distinctions in statutory terminology.
DAVID F. BRANDLEY, JR.
THOMAS B. HENSON
V. IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Although the various federal securities laws' often do not explicitly
provide for enforcement through private claims, the federal courts gener-
ally have recognized implied private rights of action under certain sections
of the laws.2 The Supreme Court first acknowledged that a private plaintiff
might maintain a cause of action under federal securities statutes not
expressly providing such a right in J.L Case Co. v. Borak.3 The plaintiff
in Borak sought relief as a stockholder under section 14(a) of the Securities
Act of 19331 (the '33 Act) for damages sustained from the circulation of
misleading proxy solicitations.5 Although the statute created no explicit
private cause of action,' the Court construed section 27 of the '33 Act- to
provide the federal courts with a broad jurisdictional mandate to entertain
such suits.' The Court stated that because the SEC alone could not ade-
quately enforce the proxy solicitation regulations, the implication of pri-
I The major federal securities acts include: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1976); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976); the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (1976); the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 52 (1976); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 21 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
1 Section 14(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the solicitation of proxy statements
in contravention of the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC governing such activi-
ties. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). The provision does not expressly provide for private enforcement
actions or remedies.
I J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1964). The plaintiff in Borak was a
stockholder of J.I. Case who asserted that the directors of the company had circulated a false
and misleading proxy statement in order to obtain approval of a proposed merger between
J.I. Case and the American Tractor Company. The plaintiff sought both equitable relief to
dissolve the merger and damages for himself and other shareholders. Id.
See note 4 supra.
Section 27 of the Securities Act of 1933 grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
"all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter. ... 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
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vate remedies was necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose of
protecting investors.9 Striking an expansive note, the Court reasoned that
the judiciary had a duty to be alert to provide such implied remedies under
the securities laws.' Following the Borak rationale, lower courts thereafter
construed federal securities statutes liberally to afford private plaintiffs
causes of action under several other sections."
During the past five years, however, the Supreme Court has adopted a
more restrictive posture towards private plaintiffs under the federal securi-
ties laws.' 2 The Court has limited the class of private litigants under those
sections that already support implied private rights by imposing restrictive
standing requirements.'3 In addition, the Court has increased the plain-
tiff's burden of proof in certain actions by requiring proof of elements of
deception and scienter.4 To avoid these restrictions, many plaintiffs now
claim under sections of the securities laws where private rights have not
yet been conclusively established.' 5 Private plaintiffs claiming under these
new sections, however, have confronted the more restrictive standard an-
nounced by the Court in Cort v. Ash'6 to determine whether a particular
federal statute supports an implied private right of action.
In Cort, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a private
plaintiff could maintain an action against an alleged violator of the Federal
Election Campaign Act.'7 In denying such a right,'" the Court identified
Id. at 432-33.
"Id. at 433.
" See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub. noma. Johnson v.
Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (implied private right under the Investment Companies Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80a (1976)); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,603 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1978) (implied
right of action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976)).
11 See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels];
1977-1978 Securities Law Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 757, 859-67 (1978).
'1 The Supreme Court has recently restricted private actions under several sections of
the federal securities laws. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court
ruled that proof of scienter was required in a Rule 10b-5 action. The Court also concluded
that no violation of section 13(d)(1) occurred where the failure to disclose was made in good
faith and the plaintiff suffered no injury from the omission in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). See generally Lowenfels, supra note 12, at 891.
" See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also note 13 supra.
" See, e.g., Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 348 (1978).
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
" Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 70-71 (1975). Corporations are prohibited from making
contributions in connection with federal elections by the Federal Election Campaign Act. 2
U.S.C.A. § 441b (1977 Cum. Supp.). (At the time of the alleged violation in Cort, however,
the applicable statute was 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970)). The plaintiff in Cort brought suit against
the Bethlehem Steel Corp. and its corporate directors for allegedly placing certain media
advertisements in connection with the 1972 Presidential election. Although the statute pro-
vided no express private remedy, the plaintiff in his capacity as a shareholder of Bethlehem
sought both damages and injunctive relief. 422 U.S. at 70-72.
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four factors which are relevant to determine whether a statute forms the
basis for an implied cause of action." Initially, the court must find that
the plaintiff is a member of the class that especially benefits from the
protection afforded by the statute."0 A statute may create certain federal
rights in a plaintiff that may be enforced through implied private actions.
Second, the court must search for an explicit or implicit legislative intent
to create or deny such a cause of action.2' The third Cort factor similarly
requires the court to determine whether the implication of a private right
is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.2
Thus, a focus on the legislative history of the statute is crucial to each of
the first three Cort inquiries. Finally, before providing the plaintiff a fed-
eral forum for relief, the court must decide if the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law.2 A determination that state law gener-
ally governs the subject matter of the suit and provides a remedy for the
plaintiff to pursue bars the implication of a federal right.24
1S The Court found that the principal purpose of the statute prohibiting corporate cam-
paign activities was to reduce the influence wielded by major corporations over federal elec-
tions, and that protecting corporate shareholders was purely a secondary effect of the statute.
422 U.S. at 82. Additionally, the Court found no legislative intent to imply a private right of
action under the statute and questioned the propriety and impact of such an implication on
the enforcement scheme. Id. at 82-84. Finally, the Court noted that ultra vires acts of corpora-
tions were traditionally concerns of state law. Id. at 84. Therefore, the Court refused to imply
a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff-stockholder under the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Id. at 85.
11 Id. at 78. The Court stated that the following issues are relevant in determining
whether a federal statute creates an implied private right of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted" . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one?. . .Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?
Id.; see text accompanying notes 20-24 infra. See also Comment, Implying Private Causes of
Actions From Federal Statutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 53 (1975).
20 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
21 Id.
2 Id. Because the third Cort factor requires a court to analyze the entire legislative
scheme underlying a statute, a court should not imply a private right of action where Congress
already has provided alternative remedies for the plaintiff. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2488 (1979).
2 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Although the Cort inquiry is directed at whether
a cause of action is a matter of state concern, courts often examine whether state law provides
the plaintiff with a remedy. See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 623 (2d
Cir. 1978), rev'd 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979).
21 One commentator has suggested that there are three facets to the fourth inquiry of the
Cort analysis. First, a court should determine if the action was one traditionally relegated to
state law. Second, the action should be in an area of basic concern to the state. Finally, it is
necessary for a court to determine if inferring a private action under the statute is inappro-
[Vol. XXXVI
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The Supreme Court subsequently applied the Cort standard to federal
securities statutes in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 25 In Chris-Craft,
the plaintiff-offeror sought to enforce a private right of action against a
competing tender offeror under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act (the Williams Act) .26 After examining the legislative history and pur-
pose of the Williams Act, the Court concluded that the Act was not in-
tended to benefit the contestants in a takeover competition. 2 Rather, the
Chris-Craft Court determined that the purpose of the Act was to regulate
these competitors and thereby protect innocent shareholders of the target
company.2 Because the plaintiff was not a primary beneficiary of the
statute,2 19 the Court refused to imply a federal right from section 14(e) and
denied the plaintiff standing to pursue the cause of action.2 0
The Chris-Craft Court applied the four-pronged analysis of Cort v. Ash
to confirm its conclusion that Chris-Craft could not assert implied rights
under the Williams Act.3' Relying upon its analysis of the legislative his-
tory, the Court determined that the plaintiff was not a member of the class
of the statute's intended beneficiaries. 32 Thus, according to the first Cort
inquiry, Chris-Craft was not entitled any special rights or benefits under
the statute. 3 Second, after examining the legislative history, the Court
found no evidence that Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to create
a private cause of action under section 14(e) in favor of the losing party in
a tender offer contest.2 Third, the Chris-Craft majority found the implica-
tion of a private right in favor of the plaintiff inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Williams Act because such an action might actually damage
the innocent shareholders of target corporations that Congress sought to
protect." Finally, the Court noted that the plaintiff could pursue a state
common law action for lost commercial opportunities against the defen-
dant and that relegating the plaintiff to state law, despite the pervasive
federal regulation of the securities industry, would not be inappropriate. 36
priate. See.Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship
on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 173-74 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pitt].
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
26 Id. at 9; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). Section 14(e) proscribes any misstatement of a
material fact or any fraudulent or manipulative acts in connection with the solicitation of
tendered shares. Id.
1 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
21 Id. at 34-35.
21 The Williams Act was designed to regulate the conduct of participants in a tender offer
contest and thus fill a void in that field of federal securities law. The Supreme Court deter-
mined that it was inconsistent for Congress to have strictly regulated the conduct of tender
offers as a whole while intending to protect a particular group of contestants. Id. at 39.
3 Id.
3' 430 U.S. at 34-41.
31 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
430 U.S. at 34-35.
Id. at 38..
Id. at 39.
:' Id. at 40-41.
1979]
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More importantly, the Chris-Craft Court adopted a generally restrictive
stance towards private rights of action by strictly construing the Borak
rationale for implication. Despite language in Borak to the contrary, the
Chris-Craft Court held that the "institutional limitations alone" on SEC
enforcement of tender offer regulations do not justify the implication of
private rights. 7 Rather, the Court required proof that an implied cause of
action-was necessary to effectuate the congressional purposes underlying
the statute, and not merely to aid in enforcement."
A. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington:
Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Supreme Court recently affirmed this restrictive posture toward
implied private rights of action under the federal securities laws in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington.1' The Redington case arose from the 1973 insol-
vency and liquidation of Weis Securities, Inc., a registered broker-dealer
and member of the New York Stock Exchange."0 The plaintiffs, the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) and the trustee in liquidation for the
brokerage firm," brought an action on behalf of Weis' customers to recover
damages from Touche Ross, the broker-dealer's independent accounting
firm. SIPC and the trustee alleged that Touche Ross prepared and certified
false and misleading financial statements in violation of section 17 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the '34 Act)." The plaintiffs further as-
serted that an implied private right of action under section 17 permitted
recovery of damages for these violations. 3 After closely examining three
factors of the Cort analysis, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the
plaintiffs' implication claim." In addition to reflecting a generally conserv-
11 Id. at 25. The Borak Court held that because the SEC alone could not adequately
enforce the proxy solicitation regulations, private enforcement was a necessary supplement
to administrative actions. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
I430 U.S. at 25.
3' 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979).
, Id. at 2483.
The plaintiff, Redington, brought the suit as trustee in liquidation of the brokerage
firm to recover damages on behalf of the firm and its customers from the defendant accoun-
tants. Id. at 2484. Redington was joined in this action by the Securities Investor Protection
Corp. (SIPC), who asserted derivative claims as the insurer of the brokerage customers. Id.
,2 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). In 1972, the date relevant to the Redington decision,
section 17 of the '34 Act provided in relevant, part:
(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium with any such
member . . . shall make, keep, and preserve for such period, such accounts ...
and other reports, and make such reports as the commission by its rules and regula-
tions may prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors . . ..
15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970). The section further provides for periodic or special inspection of such
records by the commission at any time. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1978).
, 99 S.Ct. at 2484.
" Id. at 2485-91; see text accompanying notes 58-73 infra.
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ative attitude towards the implication of private actions under the securi-
ties statutes, the Redington decision provides a valuable illustration of the
Court's implication analysis.
Section 17 of the '34 Act imposes certain accounting and administrative
reporting requirements on brokers dealing through the national securities
exchanges. 5 These brokers are required to prepare detailed financial state-
ments certified by an independent accounting firm." The SEC inspects
these certified records periodically and utilizes the statements in the en-
forcement of the net capital rule, which ensures the solvency of the na-
tional brokers." Although section 17 creates no express liabilities and im-
poses no duties on accountants," the Redington plaintiffs maintained that
the statute and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder imposed certain
obligations on certifying accountants." At trial, the district court deter-
mined that section 17 imposed no express or implied duties on accountants
and therefore dismissed all claims against the defendant. 50 On appeal, the
Second Circuit held that Congress and the SEC relied heavily upon the
independent examination of brokers' financial statements by accountants
in the enforcement scheme of the '34 Act.5 ' Applying the Cort v. Ash
analysis, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and concluded that
private plaintiffs may pursue claims against accountants who breach the
duties arising under section 17.52
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976); note 42 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1978).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1978); see 99 S.Ct. at 2486.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976); note 42 supra.
,1 99 S.Ct. at 2484. The plaintiffs appeared to rely initially upon a statutory tort theory
to recover for Touche Ross' allegedly improper audit and certification of financial statements
in 1972.1d. The statutory tort theory of liability is based upon the legislative purpose underly-
ing a statute. If a court determines that a given statute protects an individual from particular
damage, the court may imply a cause of action to permit a plaintiff to recover for the violation
of this legislatively created interest. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 286 (1934); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 36 (4th ed. 1971); Climan, Civil Liability Under The Credit-Regulation
Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 206, 225-26 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Climan]. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 286 (1965).
1 Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The district
court indicated that § 18(a) might provide the exclusive remedy for violations of § 17. Id. at
489-90.
51 Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1978).
52 Id. at 621-23. The Redington court applied the four criteria of Cort v. Ash to determine
whether section 17 supported the implications of a private right through a statutory test
analysis. The court noted that section 17 empowered the SEC to require the submission of
only those documents and reports'"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." Id. at 621; see 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976); note 42 supra. Therefore,
the court concluded that the primary purpose of the statute was to protect investors such as
the clients of brokerage houses. The Second Circuit termed the second Cort factor neutral
after finding no evidence that Congress implicitly or explicitly intended to deny private rights
under section 17. Id. at 622. The court found that implication of a private right was consistent
with the underlying legislative purposes, since such actions would aid in enforcing the statute
and afford an essential remedy to the beneficiary class. Id. at 623. Finally, the Second Circuit
1979]
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The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, began its analysis
in Redington by emphasizing that the implication issue is essentially a
matter of statutory construction. 3 Accordingly, the Court rejected the sta-
tutory tort theory of liability,54 stating that violations of federal statutes
do not automatically create private rights of action . 5 Rather, the
Redington Court limited its inquiry to whether Congress explicitly or im-
plicitly intended to create such private enforcement actions under section
17. In this regard, the Court examined three Cort factors - the intended
beneficiaries, the legislative history, and the purpose of the statute.56 Con-
cluding that these criteria militated against implying a private right of
action, the Redington Court reversed the Second Circuit without discuss-
ing the final inquiries under the Cort-Chris-Craft analysis.
5 7
Initially focusing on the intended beneficiaries of the statute,5 the
Redington Court analyzed the language of section 17 to discern the con-
gressional purpose. Acknowledging that a statute need not expressly grant
a private remedy, the Court nevertheless held that the statute at least
must proscribe certain conduct or confer federal rights on the private
plaintiff before the judiciary may imply a private action.59 The Redington
Court determined that section 17 by its terms simply imposed-administra-
tive reporting requirements on broker-dealers without prohibiting any ac-
tion or creating federal rights in any party." This information enables the
SEC to enforce the net capital rule and gives the authorities sufficient
warning of broker-dealer insolvency to protect investors.' Although the
ultimate beneficiaries of the regulatory efforts are the investing public,
62
the Court refused to conclude that Congress intended to create a retrospec-
tive implied remedy. 3
Addressing the second Cort inquiry, the Redington Court recognized
the lack of legislative history surrounding the issue of private rights under
determined that the remedy sought by the Redington plaintiffs was not one traditionally
relegated to state law. Id.
0 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979); see Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953 (1979) (implying a private right action under Title IX, 20
U.S.C. §,§ t681-86 (1976)).
11 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.Ct. at 2485; see note 49 supra.
" 99 S.Ct. at 2485; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953 (1979).
5 See text accompanying notes 58-73 infra.
, See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
" See text accompanying note 20 supra.
5, 99 S.Ct. at 2485.
' Id. at 2486. The Redington court found that section 17 of the '34 Act and Rule 17a-5
require brokers to submit financial statements certified by independent public accountants
to provide an accurate financial picture. In addition, the accountants are required to list any
matters to which they take exception in the broker's financial statement. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-5 (1978).
6, 99 S.Ct. at 2486; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1978).
6 99 S.Ct. at 2486; see Redington v. Touche Ross Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621-22 (1978).
99 S.Ct. at 2486.
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section 17 of the '34 Act.6 ' The Court interpreted the meager legislative
history, however, as consistent with the conclusion that private rights
should not be implied." In addition, the Court expressed a general reluct-
ance to imply such rights in the face of relative legislative silence, particu-
larly where the plain language of the statute does not support implica-
tion."6
According to the third Cort factor, the Supreme Court examined the
'34 Act as an entity to determine whether the ii' plication of a private right
was consistent with the overall legislative scheme. The Court initially
observed that the '34 Act contained several express private enforcement
provisions, including two which flanked section 17.7 The Court found that
section 18(a) created a limited private cause of action for section 17 viola-
tions, 8 but also recognized that SIPC and the trustee could not aid them-
selves of this express remedy." Although the Redington Court refrained
from holding that Congress intended section 18(a) to provide the exclusive
remedy for such violations," the Court was reluctant to significantly ex-
pand the scope of this express remedy.7' Therefore, the Redington Court
concluded that the implication of a private cause of action under section
17 was inconsistent with the legislative scheme of the '34 Act.72 Instead,
the Court invited Congress to legislate a new federal damage remedy if it
disagreed with the Redington result.73
61 Id.
65 Id. at 2487 n..
68 Id. at 2486-87.
'7 Id. at 2487; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78r(a) (1976).
99 S.Ct. at 2487. Section 18 of the '34 Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any applica-
tion, report or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder ... which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstan-
ces under which it was made false and misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or mislead-
ing) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security
at a price which was affected by such statement....
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The section further provides that damages suffered in reliance upor,
the misstatement may be recovered only where the plaintiff proves that he was acting in good
faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. Id.
69 99 S.Ct. at 2487. Section 18 affords a remedy only to those plaintiffs who purchased
or sold a security in reliance on the misleading statements. See note 68 supra. Often custom-
ers of brokerage houses maintain accounts with their brokers consisting of securities and the
cash proceeds from the sale of securities. The insolvency of a broker turns customers into
creditors of the firm, but no purchase or sale of a security is directly involved in the failure.
See H.R. Doc. No. 91-1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE: CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5254.
70 99 S.Ct. at 2488. The Redington Court, however, noted that significant evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that § 18(a) was intended to provide this exclusive remedy. See id. at
2488 n.15.
7' Id. at 2488.
72 See id. at 2486-88.
13 Id. at 2490-91.
1979]
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In addition to the three criteria discussed above, Cort v. Ash74 and Piper
v. Chris-Craft75 set forth two additional factors which are relevant in the
implication analysis: (a) whether the cause of action was one traditionally
relegated to state law;7 and (b) whether implication was necessary to
effectuate the statutory purposes. 7 The Redington Court, however, dec-
lined to examine these issues. Where both the plain language and the
legislative purpose behind a statute militated against implication, the
Court ruled the inquiry complete.78 Explaining this omission, the
Redington Court reemphasized the vital interrelationship between legisla-
tive intent and judicial implication of private rights of action.79 The Court
viewed the first three Cort factors as traditional indicia of legislative in-
tent." Consequently, when these factors reflect negatively on the implica-
tion issue, the Court will deem the remaining Cort and Chris-Craft factors
irrelevant.8 ' Significantly, the Redington Court revealed for the first time
that each of the Cort and Chris-Craft factors will not be accorded equal
weight in any implication analysis. 2 Rather, the first three inquiries con-
cerning legislative intent may be determinative.
Finally, the Redington Court drastically restricted the Borak implica-
tion rationales without actually disturbing the holding in that decision.
The Court held that section 27 of the '34 Act,8 4 the general jurisdictional
provision, created no private rights of action.85 Instead, the Court deter-
mined that such rights must originate in the substantive provisions of the
'34 Act. 8 Additionally, the Court withdrew from the expansive remedial
doctrine announced in Borak. 7 Acknowledging that recent decisions had
applied a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action,8"
the Redington Court expressly adopted this conservative approach.9 The
Court cautioned that the judiciary's function is to discern and implement
7" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
75 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
11 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra.





83 See text accompanying notes 3-10 supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976); see note 7 supra.
81 99 S.Ct. at 2490; see text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
8s 99 S.Ct. at 2490.
1 See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
99 S.Ct. at 2490.
s' Id. The Redington Court stated:
tlo the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the Court in
Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a




congressional intent rather than to engage in a wholesale revision of a
statutory scheme."0 As the Supreme Court will soon consider implied pri-
vate claims under other sections of the federal securities laws," the
Redington decision provides a valuable barometer of the current Court's
generally restrictive attitude towards implied private enforcement actions.
Indeed, this conservative approach has already had a significant impact
on the lower courts.92
B. Section 206 of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940
Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (the IAA) contains
broad anti-fraud language designed to prohibit any manipulative or decep-
tive practices by investment advisors. 3 Rule 206(4)-i, promulgated under
section 206 by the SEC, prohibits any investment advisor from publishing
or circulating any advertisement which contains a false or misleading
statement of a material fact.9" While both section 206 and Rule 206(4)-i
:0d.
" See, e.g., Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct.
348 (1978).
12 See, e.g., Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. 1979).
" Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospec-
tive client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; ...
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative....
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
The section further provides the SEC with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the conduct of investment advisors. Section 206 is similar to Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1978), as both provisions contain broad antifraud language. See also section 17
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976). One difference between the provisions
is that Rule 10b-5 applies only where a purchaser-seller relationship is established, while
section 206 protects either clients or prospective clients. Thus, section 206 is not limited as
severely in its scope as Rule 10b-5 protection. See Note, Private Causes of Action Under
Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act, 74 MH. L. REv. 308, 331-36 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Section 206 Actions].
- " Rule 206(4)-i states in relevant part:
(a) It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulating act, practice or
course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act, for any invest-
ment adviser, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate or distribute any adver-
tisement:
- (5) Which contains any untrue statement of a material fact, which is
otherwise false or misleading.
(b) For the purposes of this section the term "advertisement" shall include any
notice, circular, letter or other written communication addressed to more than one
person. . . which offers. . .any analysis, report, or publication concerning securi-
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regulate the conduct of investment counselors, neither provision expressly
provides for private enforcement of violations. In Abrahamson v.
Fleschner5 and Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp.," however, the
Second and Fifth Circuits considered the question of implied private ac-
tions under section 206 and Rule 206(4)-i in light of the Cort and Chris-
Craft decisions . 7 Both the Abrahamson and Wilson courts concluded that
these provisions support the implication of private rights of action in favor
of investment clients injured through violations of the IAA.1
In Abrahamson, the plaintiffs were limited partners in an investment
group established and managed by Fleschner and other general partners.
The partnership allegedly emphasized the conservative nature of its in-
vestment policy and.portfolio holdings in its communications with the
plaintiffs, thereby inducing them to join and remain associated with. the
group. 10 When the Abrahamsons discovered that a large percentage of the
portfolio securities were unregistered,'' they withdrew from the invest-
ment partnership. The plaintiff in Wilson retained the defendant as his
investment counselor after learning of its innovative investment manage-
ties, or which is to be used in making any determination as to when to buy or sell
any security, or which security to buy or sell, or. . . any other investment advisory
service with regard to securities.
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-l (1978).
'5 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913 (1978).
" 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978).
,T See also Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct.
348 (1978).
Is See text accompanying notes 100-141 infra. The plaintiffs in both Wilson and
Abrahamson also asserted claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Wilson contended that the execution
of the power of attorney over his portfolio in favor of the defendant met the purchase and
sale requirements under Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1978). Likewise, the Abra-
hamsons asserted that the 1968 modification of the investment partnership agreement consti-
tuted a purchase or sale of a security. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d
Cir. 1977). Both courts rejected these arguments and dismissed the section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims.
1, Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1977). The plaintiffs, Robert
and Marjorie Abrahamson, joined the investment group at its inception in 1965 as limited
partners. As the investment group grew, more general partners became associated with the
venture and, in 1966 and 1968, new partnership agreements were completed to include the
new general and limited partners. By 1968, the group consisted of three general partners and
sixty-six limited partners. Id. at 866.
11 In 1964 and 1965, the plaintiffs met with Fleschner concerning the establishment of
an investment partnership. The plaintiffs emphasized their desire for financial security and
conservative investments, and the defendant assured them that the partnership would have
such a policy. In addition, the partnership issued monthly reports containing investment
performance materials and statements of policy representing a "low risk stance" and "a most
conservative posture". Id.
"Io Id. at 867. Unregistered securities are investments that are not subject to registration
with the SEC. These securities are subject to restrictions on further sales and, therefore, have
only limited marketability. Id. at 867 n.3.
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ment techniques. 2 The plaintiff subsequently executed a full power of
attorney in favor of First Houston to enable the corporation to purchase
and sell securities in his name.0 3 While under the defendant's management
for a year and one half, Wilson's account substantially diminished in
value.' Not until First Houston resigned from management of the account
did the plaintiff discover the extent of his losses and learn that the
"innovative techniques" had never been fully utilized. 5 The plaintiffs in
both Abrahamson and Wilson asserted that section 206 of the IAA and
Rule 206(4)-i created implied private rights of action enabling them to
recover damages for the alleged misrepresentations and mismanage-
ment. 0
Both the Wilson and Abrahamson courts used the Cort four-pronged
inquiry to analyze implied private rights under section 206 of the IAA."°7
Addressing the first factor of the Cort analysis, both courts determined
that the plaintiffs were members of the "class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted."'0 8 The legislative history and purpose of the IAA
demonstrates a congressional intent to protect small investors from fraud-
ulent conduct and overreaching by investment counselors.' Furthermore,
'1 Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff
in Wilson learned from a magazine article that First Houston utilized a computer analysis
technique to evaluate investments and eliminate any securities not meeting certain perform-
ance criteria. A representative of First Houston subsequently confirmed the article's contents
and induced Wilson to retain the defendant as investmeht counselors. Id.
103 Id. By executing the power of attorney, the plaintiff gave First Houston discretionary
authority to dispose of and manage his current holdings of securities. The defendant immedi-
ately converted all of the plaintiff's investments to securities selected by First Houston. Id.
1"4 Id. Wilson's portfolio declined in value from over $100,000 at the time First Houston
initially began management to less than $5,500 when the defendant resigned. Id.
105 Id.
10 The plaintiffs in Abrahamson claimed damages for the injuries suffered through the
investment partnership's misrepresentations. From 1966 to 1968, the firm's financial state-
ments were prepared by another accounting firm and the 1969 report disclosed, for the first
time, that a large percentage of the firm's securities were unregistered. Thereafter, the Abra-
hamsons withdrew from the investment partnership and brought suit against the investment
group and the Goodkin accountants. 568 F.2d at 867. The plaintiffs claimed that they should
recover the difference between the value of their investments in 1968 and the value when they
actually withdrew from the partnership in 1970. This period represented the interval in which
the investment firm acquired substantial holdings of unregistered securities. Id. at 867 n.6.
See also Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1978).
11 See text accompanying notes 109-134 infra.
108 566 F.2d at 1240; 568 F.2d at 870-71.
"I' H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940). By enacting the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, Congress intended to protect investors from certain practices of invest-
ment advisors. The report accompanying the Act in the House of Representatives stated that
"this legislation is needed to protect small investors from breaches of trust upon the part of
unscrupulous managements and to provide such investors with a regulated institution for the
investment of their savings." Id; see Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1240
(5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner 568 F.2d 862, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1977). See also S. REP.
No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); SEC, Investment Counsel, Investment Supervisory and
Investment Advisory Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).
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the Supreme Court previously examined the legislative history of the IAA
and found that Congress intended to protect the average investor and
safeguard the fiduciary relationships between client and advisor."*0 As each
plaintiff retained his advisor to manage his investment and in fact dele-
gated this responsibility to his advisor, the two courts correctly determined
that section 206 and Rule 206(4)-i created federal rights in favor of the
plaintiffs."'
Reviewing the legislative history of the IAA, the Wilson and
Abrahamson majorities failed to discern an intent to either create or deny
a private right of action."' Although arguably Congress never considered
enforcement of the Act through private suits," 3 the language of the juris-
dictional statute may be read to preclude such private rights."4 In drafting
section 214 of the IAA,"15 the general jurisdictional provision, Congress
omitted the words "actions at law" and gave the federal courts jurisdic-
tion only over "suits in equity to enjoin any violation. . ." of the Act.,"
The dissents in both Wilson and Abrahamson emphasized this omission
as indicative of the congressional intent to provide a limited enforcement
scheme for the IAA."17 Indeed, if the omission was calculated, Congress
may have intended to preclude any private damage suits under the IAA
by withholding jurisdiction, because such actions would always be "at
law.""' The Supreme Court previously has held that an explicit congres-
sional intent to deny private actions, evidenced in the legislative history,
would prohibit the implication of a private right from a statute. "' Congress
,,0 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-92 (1963).
Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1977); see Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at
316; Note, Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1513, 1524 (1978).
112 See text accompanying notes 114-122 infra.
"I Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875 (2d Cir. 1977); Section 206 Actions, supra
note 93, at 316.
"I See text accompanying notes 115-118 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976).
,, Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976) (jurisdictional section of the '33 Act) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976) (jurisdictional provision of the '34 Act) with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976) (section
214 of the IAA).
"I See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
"I Id. A federal court might assert general federal question jurisdiction under 23 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976) to consider such implied actions even in the absence of an explicit congressional
delegation of jurisdiction. See Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at 318. Resolving the
jurisdictional issue, therefore, does not resolve the question of legislative intent. A court still
must determine if Congress intended to exclude private enforcement actions under section
206 of the IAA.
"' Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). In National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak), the Supreme Court determined that Congress
intended to deny private enforcement actions under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1971
(the Amtrak Act), 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. In Amtrak, the plaintiff association brought a
private action seeking to enforce the Amtrak Act and enjoin the discontinuance of certain
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apparently did not regard the omission as significant, however, for both the
House and Senate Reports termed section 214 of the IAA "generally com-
parable" to the jurisdictional provisions of other securities acts which ex-
pressly include actions at law. 2 ' The majorities in Abrahamson and Wilson
noted that Congress failed to provide for any express private remedies in
the IAA, making the inclusion of the "actions at law" language super-
fluous. 1 21 In sum, the absence of the jurisdictional language from section
214 is ambiguous on the issue of congressional intent to create or deny
implied private actions based on section 206 of the Act.
2 2
The Abrahamson and Wilson courts then addressed the third Cort
inquiry, whether the implication of a private right is consistent with the
underlying legislative purpose. The objective of the IAA is to protect the
small investor by regulating investment counseling practices.2 The only
remedy for investment clients under the Act is filing a complaint with the
SEC, and even this remedy is not compensatory.2 4 The implication of a
private remedy under section 206 is consistent with the enforcement ra-
tionale of the Borak decision.2' In addition, such an action would permit
innocent investors to recover for injuries sustained through breaches of
their advisors' fiduciary duties.2 6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
previously directed that the IAA should be construed flexibly to effectuate
its remedial purposes.'2 The implication of a private right under section
206 benefits the protected class of small investors, aids in the enforcement
of the IAA and, therefore, seems consistent with the remedial legislative
passenger trains. 414 U.S. at 454. The Amtrak Court held that the Act conferred exclusive
enforcement power on the Attorney General, with only a limited exception in the case of labor
agreements. Id. at 464. The Court found significant evidence in the legislative history of the
Act that Congress considered and rejected the alternative of enforcement through general
private actions. Id. at 458-61. Thus, the Amtrak Court refused to imply a private right of
action under the Act based on both the omission of express provisions in the statute and
additional evidence of legislative intent. In contrast, analyzing implied rights under section
206 of the IAA, the evidence shows that Congress never gxplicitly considered the question of
private actions under the IAA. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 876 n.23 (2d Cir.
1977). Therefore, reliance upon merely the statutory omission of jurisdiction to preclude
private rights under section 206 is inappropriate.
212 See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875 (2d Cir. 1977). See also S. REP. No.
1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 23 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 30 (1940).
121 Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (5th Cir. 1978); Abraham-
son v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1977).
"2 See Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1978); Abraham-
son v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875 (2d Cir. 1977); Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at 316-
20.
12 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
In See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976) (section 209 of the Investment Advisors Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3 (1976) (section 203 of the IAA). See also Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at 321.
225 See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. But see text accompanying notes 83-90
supra.
22 See Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at 321.
" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), cited in Abra-
hamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875 (2d Cir. 1977).
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purposes of the Act.'
Finally, in accordance with the Cort v. Ash analysis, the Wilson court
examined relevant state law to determine if the cause of action Was one
traditionally relegated to state law.' 29 The Wilson court, however, recog-
nized that the common law provided little protection to the investor from
the fraudulent conduct of his advisor.'30 The Supreme Court has noted the
limitations of the common law doctrine of fraud in dealing with the sale
of intangibles such as investment advice.'"' Although many states have
recently adopted anti-fraud statutes designed to protect investors from
fraudulent counseling practices,' many legislatures patterned their stat-
utes after the federal laws.' Therefore, the Wilson majority concluded
that the pervasive federal regulation of the securities industry justified the
implication of a federal cause of action for fraudulent investment advisor
conduct.'3
Before implying a private cause of action based on a federal statute,
the Chris-Craft decision requires a court to address the necessity of such
an action. 3 5 Both the Wilson and Abrahamson courts found that a denial
of such a private right would undermine and defeat the purposes of federal
regulation of investment advisors.'36 In addition, the Wilson court could
ascertain no alternate means of achieving the congressional goal of protect-
ing investors and noted no adverse impact on the beneficiary class by
implying a cause of action. 131 Such holdings necessarily imply that the
express enforcement provisions of the IAA delegated to the SEC are incap-
able of adequately regulating the field.'38 Nevertheless, after Chris-Craft
and Redington, a reliance on the enforcement rationale alone is insufficient
'" Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1977); see Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at
321.
' Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1978). Unfortun-
ately, the Abrahamson court did not address the state law issue in its decision.
130 Id. at 1242.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963). The Court
acknowledged that common law fraud developed around transactions involving tangible
property such as land and had limited applicability in many current settings. A plaintiff in
a common law fraud action is often handicapped by the strict requirements of proof of actual
damages and reliance. Id.
112 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25235 (West 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, § 137.12J
(Smith-Hurd 1978 Cum. Supp.); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-12.1 (Bums 1978 Cum. Supp.); MICH.
COMp. LAWS. ANN. § 451.502 (1978-1979 Cum. Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-53 (West 1970);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page 1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-503 (1978).
'" See Section 206 Actions, supra note 93, at 322.
lu Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d at 1242.
' See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
's Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 876 (2d Cir. 1977).
,37 Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d at 1243.
'' See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874 (2d Cir. 1977). See also text accompa-
nying note 9 supra.
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to support the implication of private rights.3 ' The crucial test now is
whether the congressional purposes will be frustrated in the absence of
such rights."' The Wilson and Abrahamson courts reasoned that the pro-
tection of investors would be defeated absent the additional enforcement
and compensation provided through private causes of action.' Therefore,
under the majority analyses in Wilson and Abrahamson, the plaintiffs
satisfied the implication tests of Cort and the necessity requirement of
Chris-Craft.
The disseriting opinions in Wilson and Abrahamson recognized and
emphasized entirely different legislative purposes behind the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.42 The dissenters maintained that the Act was pri-
marily designed as a census mechanism to gather information about the
industry through registration requirements.' To avoid undue disruption
of the investment advisory industry, the dissenters noted that Congress
also imposed a code of conduct on advisors to be enforced by the SEC. 4 '
Such an analysis is consistent with the limited express enforcement
scheme established by Congress because SEC injunctive actions to enjoin
violations of the Act would always proceed in equity.' More importantly,
this view of the IAA makes the implication of private actions in favor of
investment clients unnecessary to effectuate the uiderlying legislative
purposes.'4' The plaintiffs no longer assert especial federal rights derived
from the statute but rather benefit indirectly from the provisions of the
Act." 7 Consequently, according to the standards of Cort and Chris-Craft,
'D See text accompanying notes 37-38, 83-90 supra.
14 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
" Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 876 (2d Cir. 1977).
"I Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243-44 (5th Cir. 1978) (Hill, J.,
dissenting); see Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879-80 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
M3 566 F.2d at 1243-44; 568 F.2d at 879-80. The legislative history of the Investment
Advisors Act shows that the SEC viewed the registration and reporting requirements as a
mechanism to gain data about the industry. One representative of the SEC viewed the
compilation of this background information as a preliminary step towards more comprehen-
sive regulation of investment advisors. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879-80
(2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Hearings on S. 3580 before
the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 48
(1940).
H4 See Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978) (Hill, J.,
dissenting).
"I Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring
and dissenting).
"I' See id. If the purpose of the IAA was merely to effect a compulsory census of the
securities industry and to initiate federal registration of investment advisors, then implica-
tion of private remedies in favor of defrauded clients would not aid in achieving this objective.
Id.
1'4 Cf. Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) (court determined that plaintiff was not a
beneficiary of section 7 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976)); text accompanying notes 58-
63 supra.
19791
960 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
the dissenters in Wilson and Abrahamson concluded that the implication
of private actions under section 206 of the IAA was inappropriate.'4 8
The legislative history of the IAA supports both the majority and dis-
senting interpretations of the congressional purposes underlying the Act.'
However, the Supreme Court previously has held that a fundamental pur-
pose of the IAA included the protection of small investors. 50 Thus, section
206 not only proscribes specific conduct 5' but evidences a specific intent
to protect a special class. According to the Redington analysis, that inten-
tion may be determinative of the implication question.', Therefore, the
majority positions in Wilson and Abrahamson logically extend the protec-
tion of the Act by affording investors implied private rights of action under
section 2(6.15 In light of its recently restrictive approach to implied rights,
however, the Supreme Court may not affirmatively endorse private actions
under section 206.
C. Section 7 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 7 of the '34 Act is essentially a credit regulation statute dealing
with broker margin requirements and administered by the Federal Reserve
Board.'514 The statute does not explicitly provide for private enforcement
or remedies for violations of the provision.'55 Nevertheless, federal courts
have liberally implied private rights of action in favor of brokerage custom-
ers injured through such margin violations.58 Recent decisions, however,
have reevaluated the implication of private rights under section 7 in light
"I Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring
and dissenting); Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1245 (5th Cir. 1978) (Hill,
J., dissenting).
"I See notes 109 and 143 supra.
150 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-92 (1963).
'5, See note 93 supra. See also text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
152 See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
Accord Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct.
348 (1978).
's, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976). Section 7 of the '34 Act provides in relevant part:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for
the extention or maintenance of credit to or for any customer-
(1) on any security (other than an exempted security) in contravention of the
rules and regulations which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall prescribe . ...
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
', See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972); Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Junger
v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 880 (1971).
But see Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977); Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
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of Cort v. Ash and Piper v. Chris-Craft."7 These courts have generally
concluded that brokerage customers may not assert private causes of ac-
tion under the statute. "' A recent Fourth Circuit opinion, Stern v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., "I exemplifies this trend away from
implied rights under section 7 of the '34 Act.
The plaintiff in Stern sought compensation for losses incurred during
a course of trading which alledgedly violated federal margin require-
ments.' He asserted that these requirements permitted only cash pur-
chases of "call options," but that his broker, Merrill Lynch, wrongfully
extended him credit to make such purchases. "' Stern contended that sec-
tion 7 and Regulation T, "I promulgated thereunder by the Federal Reserve
Board, afforded him an implied right of action against his broker. Section
7 and Regulation T, however, only expressly permit civil and criminal
enforcement of the margin requirement by the SEC or the Attorney Gen-
eral. "'63 Consequently, the Stern court applied the Cort and Chris-Craft
criteria to analyze the implication of private causes of action under section
7.
The Stern court initially engaged in an extensive review of the histori-
cal implication theories and their application to section 7.11 Thereafter,
the court examined the legislative history of the statute to determine
whether Congress intended to afford the plaintiff's class special protection
through the margin regulations. The Fourth Circuit found that the primary
objective of section 7 was to provide a macro-economic control over exten-
sions of credit in the securities exchanges."' Margin regulations serve to
protect the economy from the pyramiding effects of unrestricted margin
trading, which in turn generate instability in the financial markets.", Of
"I See Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977); Tucker
v. Janota, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D. li. Nov. 1, 1978); Drasner v.
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Schy v. FDIC, [1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,242 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
Is See note 157 supra. See generally, Climan, Civil Liability Under The Credit-
Regulation Provisions of the Securitiei Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Cowma L. Rav. 206 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Climan]; Note, Implied Private Actions for Federal Margin Violations:
The Cort v. Ash Factors, 47 FoRDHAm L. REv. 242 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Margin
Violations].
" [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979).
Id. at 95,910-912.
1i Id.
16 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1979).
"3 See Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) % 96,528 (D. Md. 1978) at 94,087.
"I The Stern court reviewed the origins and development of both the statutory tort
theory of liability and the enforcement rationale behind implication of private actions. There-
after, the court concluded that the Cort v. Ash analysis had rendered these theories obsolete.
See Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1,979) at 95,895-899.
" See id. at 95,905-907.
" Id.; see Climan, supra note 158, at 208-18; Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a
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incidental, and decidedly secondary importance was the protection that
the margin requirements afforded investors." 7 More importantly, Congress
imposed equal responsibility for margin violations on investors as well as
brokers through the addition of section 7(f) in 1970.68 This provision pro-
hibits an investor from accepting any credit extended by a broker in viola-
tion of the margin regulations."9 Judge Butzner, in a dissenting opinion,
argued that section 7(f) should only be construed to prohibit implied pri-
vate damage actions by investors who knowingly violate the margin regula-
tion. 170 However, the majority refused to accept the proposition that Con-
gress intended to protect investors while simultaneously imposing respon-
sibility for violations of the statute on the same group. 7' Therefore, the
court concluded that the plaintiff was not a member of the class entitled
to assert especial rights under the statute.
7 2
Addressing the second Cort inquiry, the Stern court found that the
negative implications of the first Cort factor were determinative of the
legislative intent. If Congress specifically did not intend to benefit the
private investor by enacting section 7, Congress also did not intend to
create a private enforcement action in favor of the investor. 7 ' In fact,
Congress never directly considered the question of implied rights for mar-
gin violations. 74 Therefore, as the district court observed, the second factor
in the Cort analysis is ambiguous.
7 5
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the Chris-Craft decision as rephrasing
the third Cort factor, the consistency of implication with the underlying
legislative purpose, to include a determination of whether the implication
Basis for Civil Liability, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1462, 1469 (1966); Federal Margin Violations,
supra note 158, at 250-52.
"I See Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) at 95,906.
I" Id. at 95,900-903. Section 7(f) of the '34 Act places equal responsibility for margin
violations on the investor. The provision states in relevant part:
It is unlawful for any United States person, or any foreign person controlled
by a United States person or action on behalf of or in conjunction with such person,
to obtain, receive or enjoy the beneficial use of a loan or other extension of credit
from any lender . . . for the purpose of (A) purchasing or carrying United States
securities, or (B) purchasing or carrying within the United States of any securities,
if, under this section or rules and regulations prescribed thereunder, the loan or
other credit transaction is prohibited if it has been made ....
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1976).
"' See note 168 supra.
,70 Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) at 95,915 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
'"' Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [Current] FED. SEC. L. RESP.
(CCH) T 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) at 95,904-905.
112 Id. at 95,907.
173 Id.
"I See Federal Margins Violations, supra note 158, at 253.
I' Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,528 (D. Md. 1978) at 94,089.
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was necessary to effectuate congressional goals.'76 Although the court ac-
knowledged that the implication of private actions might aid in the en-
forcement of margin violations, 71 the court reasoned that only widespread
violations posed a genuine hazard to the economy.7 8 Thus, the Stern court
concluded that SEC enforcement action would be a more efficient method
of ensuring compliance than a multiplicity of private actions.'" Addition-
ally, the court noted that permitting margin violators to recover losses
might actually encourage investors to engage in such activities. 80 There-
fore, the Stern court concluded that the underlying legislative purposes
militated against implying a private right of action under section 7.I8,
Finally, in addressing the fourth Cort factor, the Stern court acknowl-
edged that implication of a private right under section 7 would not conflict
with the traditional concerns of state law.182 The court observed that mar-
gin violations alone would not form the basis for an actionable claim under
state securities statutes.'" However, the majority noted that Stern had
alleged that the instant transactions contained elements of fraud which
would be governed by state common law. 4 Thus, the court determined
that the district court correctly dismissed Stem's claim for an implied
federal right of action under section 7 of the '34 Act.'
Although section 7 does prohibit certain conduct, the statute fails to
meet the Redington criteria for the implication of private rights. In Chris-
Craft, the Supreme Court refused to characterize "a party whose pre-
viously unregulated conduct was purposefully brought under federal con-
trol" as the principal beneficiary of that statute. 88 Since section 7(f) now
prohibits private investors from engaging in illegal margin trading, the
Stern court similarly denied beneficiary status to the plaintiff. In addition,
the express language of section 7(c) does not purport to create any damage
rights or other remedy. 7 The Stern decision, therefore, is consistent with
' ' Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) at 95,909; see text accompanying note 38 supra.
I" Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. July 16, 1979) at 95,909.
I's The Stern court determined that only widespread margin violations could adversely
effect the macro-economic conditions that Congress sought to control through the imposition
of margin requirements. Id.
17' Id.
250 Id. The Stern court noted that by implying a private cause of action for margin
violations in favor of investors, the investor was in a "no loss" situation. If his investments
prospered, he reaped the rewards. If the investments soured, however, the investor could pass






"' Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977).
257 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979).
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